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The Job Network is no longer suited to a labour market characterised by lower unemployment, 
widespread skill shortages and a growing proportion of job seekers who are highly disadvantaged 
and long-term unemployed. Today the problem is not simply finding a job it is finding employers 
appropriately skilled labour. Our employment services system must do much more to connect 
those who can work with the vacancies employers need to fill. 
We should also expect our employment services system to empower the most disadvantaged  
job seekers to participate fully in the economy and in their communities. 
Job seekers want work. Employers want workers. Employment services need the flexibility and 
resources to help the most disadvantaged job seekers to acquire the skills that they and employers 
need.
These are the clear messages from job seekers, employers and employment service providers who 
have contributed to the Government’s review of employment services. 
The Government will invest $3.7 billion over three years from  July 2009 in a new generation of 
employment services. An additional 238 000 training places in areas of skill shortages are being 
made available to job seekers at a cost of over $880 million over five years. This commitment to 
employment and training will be supported by complementary investments that promote 
workforce participation, through child care and the taxation system. 
We are committed to employment services delivered through high-quality, not-for-profit and for-
profit organisations, and we will create a new system that provides better, more tailored assistance 
to disadvantaged job seekers and places greater emphasis on assisting employers to fill job 
vacancies. 
The purpose of this discussion paper is to seek your views on the future framework for employment 
services, and about how best to implement it. We welcome your feedback and invite you to work 
with us to deliver better skilled workers for Australia.
Minister’s foreword 
The Hon Brendan O’Connor MP 
Minister for Employment Participation
May 2008
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Glossary 
ABS Australian Bureau of Statistics
ACCI Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry
APM Active Participation Model
CALD Culturally and Linguistically Diverse
CDEP Community Development Employment Projects
DEEWR Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations
DEWR Department of Employment and Workplace Relations 
DEN Disability Employment Network
DSP Disability Support Pension
ESA Employment Service Areas
ESC Employment Services Contract
EPF Employment Pathway Fund
EPP Employment Pathway Plan
IEP Indigenous Employment Program
JCA Job Capacity Assessment
JPET Job Placement, Employment and Training
JPLO Job Placement Licensed Organisations
JSCI Job Seeker Classification Instrument
JSSO Job Search Support Only
JSKA Job Seeker Account
NEIS New Enterprise Incentive Scheme
NESA National Employment Services Association
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PSP Personal Support Program
VRS Vocational Rehabilitation Services
WfD Work for the Dole
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More disadvantaged job seekers
When the Job Network was introduced in 998, 
the unemployment rate was 7.7 per cent.  
The unemployment rate is now 4.2 per cent. 
Although the country has experienced a 
significant and welcome fall in unemployment, 
a higher proportion of job seekers are 
disadvantaged and have experienced  
long-term unemployment. 
The proportion of job seekers on the  
Job Network case load who have been in 
receipt of benefits for five years or more has 
increased from 8 per cent in September 
2004 to 29 per cent in March 2008.
Just under 20 per cent of the Job Network 
case load was classified as highly 
disadvantaged in July 2003, compared  
to 29 per cent in March 2008.
In 999 around one in ten unemployment 
benefit recipients were in receipt of benefits 
for five or more years. By March 2008 this had 
increased to almost one in four.
Widespread skill shortages
The new labour market environment is also one 
of employers needing workers. Despite 7 years 
of continuous economic growth, Australia faces 
an unprecedented skills shortage. Boosting 
workforce participation is also necessary to 
maintain our global competitiveness, and to 
help reduce the inflationary burden left by the 
previous Government.
Australia faces a significant shortfall in the supply 
of workers with the required vocational 
qualifications. Currently 87 per cent of available 
jobs require post-school qualifications, but 50 per 



cent of the workforce lacks these qualifications.  
The best estimate is that if the supply of people with 
VET qualifications remains at the same level as in 
2005, a shortfall of 240 000 can be expected over 
the 10 years to 2016.1
Review of employment services
The Job Network is not suited to this changed 
economic environment. 
…[T]he Job Network has played a significant part 
in assisting those who are job-ready to re-enter the 
workforce, albeit in a period of sustained economic 
growth, it is our contention that it is now poorly 
configured to achieve optimal sustainable 
outcomes for the more disadvantaged and 
vulnerable job seekers considered within an 
approach better focused on capacity building  
and social integration in the longer term.2
Against this backdrop and the Government’s 
agenda for social inclusion and commitment to 
boosting the skills and productive capacity of 
our workforce, the Government commenced a 
review of the Job Network, in consultation with 
the industry and in accordance with the 
following aims:
early intervention to minimise the number  
of long-term, welfare-dependent Australians 
of working age
providing services that are relevant to the 
circumstances and needs of the job seeker
ensuring job seekers who are struggling the 
most get the most intensive assistance
providing meaningful incentives for training 
and ensuring there are means for job seekers 
who are in need of training to get that training




Chapter 1—the Job Network
 
 Facing up to Australia  s skills challenge: industry sets key priorities to address the skills crisis, April 6, 
2008, ACTU, AiG, GTA, AEU, Dusseldorp Skills Forum.
2 Brotherhood of St Laurence, Sustainable outcomes for disadvantaged job seekers: Submission to the  
Australian Government on the Future of Employment Assistance, February 2008, p. .
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meeting skill shortages
providing the greatest rewards when  
Job Network providers find sustainable jobs 
for job seekers as fast as possible
ensuring there is a performance 
management and tendering system that 
properly accounts for quality performance
minimising the amount of time and money 
spent on administration.
In addition to more than 260 submissions  
from a range of stakeholders, the Minister for 
Employment Participation has been talking to 
employment service providers, employers and 
employer associations, unions, state and federal 
parliamentarians and program participants.  
Job seeker satisfaction surveys, program 
evaluations and reports of the Auditor-General 
have also informed the review. 
The process has revealed an overwhelming 
mood for change with a number of key  
themes emerging.




Poorly targeted assistance
The considerable public investment in 
employment assistance has not been targeted 
to those most in need. Net impact evaluations 
have shown that Job Network has a very high 
deadweight cost. Three-quarters of those who 
participated in Customised Assistance and 
subsequently found work would have found 
employment anyway.3 This means taxpayers’ 
money is spent on job seekers who could get  
a job without assistance.
Conversely, the most disadvantaged job seekers 
do not receive enough help. In 200, the OECD 
in its report on its review of labour market 
policies in Australia, Innovations in Labour 
Market Policies: the Australian Way4 identified 
inadequacies in assistance provided to the 
hardest-to-service clients; particularly in relation 
to fragmented services and low levels of 
training. Comments in submissions indicate this 
has not fundamentally improved since then.
…the programs and funding that are available do 
not provide for the specific needs of those who fall 
into the ‘hard core unemployable’ 5 
Evaluations have shown that greater 
engagement with providers is a determinant  
of successful outcomes for disadvantaged  
job seekers.6 However, around 27 000 of the 
most disadvantaged job seekers are on the 
waiting list for the capped PSP. 
It is unsatisfactory that clients with a 
recommendation to specialist services such as  
PSP … are referred to the Job Network because 
there are no places available. It is further 
unsatisfactory that these clients with identified 
specialist need are most often only eligible for the 
most basic level of services.7
The Government has decided to extend 
DEN and VRS contracts until 28 February 
200 to enable further consideration of the 
future of disability employment services, 
including the outcomes of the National 
Mental Health and Disability Employment 
Strategy. Consequently employment 
assistance delivered through DEN and VRS 
is not considered in this discussion paper.
www.workplace.gov.au/ESReview
 
3 DEWR, 2006, Customised Assistance, Job Search Training, Work for the Dole and Mutual Obligation A Net Impact 
Study, EPPB Report/2006, DEWR, Canberra.
4 OECD 200, Innovations in Labour Market Policies: the Australian Way.
5 Toll Group, Submission to Review of Employment Services, cover letter.
6  DEWR, 2006 Job Network Best Practice, September 2006, pp.6 20.
7 NESA Submission to Review of Employment Services, p. 28.
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PSP and JPET participants also do not have access 
to the JSKA or similar facility to help them access 
the services they need to overcome their barriers, 
even though job seekers in Job Network with far 
less complex needs do. 
Continuum too rigid
Evaluations of Job Network have shown the 
value of individualised and flexible service 
delivery.8 The time-based servicing continuum 
is inflexible and requires all job seekers to be 
treated in the same way at the same time. 
Not all job seekers need exactly the same service at 
the same point in their period of unemployment.9
The inflexibility in the continuum is as much  
a result of contractual and other requirements 
imposed on providers, as it is about the  
model itself. 
However the reality is that the evolution of the 
operating environment has resulted in an extremely 
restricted capacity for providers to practice in this 
way particularly arising from the increased 
specificity and prescription of service requirements.10
Others criticised the continuum as resulting in 
significant churning for job seekers who move 
between specialist programs, periods of 
intensive assistance, WfD, and sporadic or  
casual employment.
 Increasing complexity, with emphasis on sequential 
triggers for additional assistance or cross referral 
between programs, has limited the system’s capacity 
to meaningfully assist disadvantaged job seekers.11
Lack of incentives for skills and training
Evaluation data indicates that employment 
outcomes increase with education level.  
For example, job seekers who have participated 
in a first period of Customised Assistance with 
post-secondary qualifications have employment 
outcome rates nearly 60 per cent higher  
than those who have not completed Year 0  
at school.2 
However, current contract arrangements and 
incentives skew employment provider behaviour 
towards obtaining short-term jobs rather than 
equipping job seekers with the skills they need  
to obtain sustainable employment and contribute 
to Australia’s skills base and productivity.  
The fact that the number of apprenticeship 
commencements from Job Network has halved 
since 998 supports this contention. 
Currently employment services providers are not 
appropriately rewarded for investing in job seekers’ 
potential through education and training. There is 
little structural support or recognition that 
education and training can and does lead to more 
meaningful employment for the individual, 
improved potential for long-term financial 
independence and better contribution to highly 
demanded skills required by business.13
Any training that does take place must not be 
for its own sake, but must address the needs  
of employers. 
Better linkages with employers and the needs of 
business and industry will assist employment service 
providers and job seekers to better tailor training.14
 
8 See DEWR, 2006 Job Network Best Practice, September 2006; DEWR 2006 Customised Assistance, Job Search 
training, Work for the Dole and Mutual Obligation a Net Impact Study, April 2006; and DEWR, 2006 Job Network 
Job Seeker Account Evaluation, August 2006.
9 Djerriwarrh Employment & Education Service Inc, Submission to Review of Employment Services, p. .
0 NESA Submission to Review of Employment Services, p. 9.
 Brotherhood of St Laurence, Sustainable outcomes for disadvantaged job seekers: submission to the Australian 
Government on the Future of Employment Assistance, p. 5.
2 DEWR 2006, Customised Assistance, Job Search Training, Work for the Dole and Mutual Obligation- A Net Impact 
Study, EPPB Report/2006.
3 NESA, Submission to Review of Employment Services, p. 32.
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Employment services are too complex  
and fragmented
There are presently nine major employment 
programs, each with its own set of contractual 
obligations, creating unnecessary administrative 
complexity. 
[Changes over the life of the Job Network and other 
programs] have substantially increased the 
fragmentation and complexity of the overall 
system, undermine the confidence of providers, and 
increase the expenditure on program monitoring 
and compliance—both of funded providers and 
job seeker clients.15
The fragmentation also makes it difficult to 
develop a coherent pathway to employment  
for each job seeker. 
…the current arrangements particularly with the 
APM, the continuum and the multitude of program 
are very confusing for job seekers and result in many 
people being ‘bounced’ around between Centrelink 
and providers of different programs, often with little 
understanding of why they are there.16
These views are also reflected in job seeker 
satisfaction surveys which suggest that almost  
a quarter of job seekers were not satisfied with 
the services provided by the Job Network, 
including because the service was limited, 
inflexible or unresponsive to their needs.7 
The multitude of programs raises practical 
issues for service delivery, particularly where  
a provider delivers more than one service. 
The current suite of programs has differing 
objectives for different target groups requiring a 
range of service delivery modes and skills sets to 
effectively deliver these programs.18
The array of different programs means that  
job seekers are not effectively serviced for  
long periods of time. For example, job seekers 
referred to WfD effectively lose touch with their 
Job Network provider for six months as they  
are ‘out-of-sight, out-of-mind’. This is 
exacerbated by the fact that CWCs  
(who deliver WfD)  are not rewarded if job 
seekers, while in WfD, obtain employment. 
Excessive red tape 
The administrative burden and red tape 
associated with too many contracts and an 
over-emphasis on processes rather than 
outcomes reduces the capacity of providers  
to service job seekers. 
Up to 60 per cent of consultants’ time is spent on 
administration.19
Many submissions from providers report that 
over time there has been an increase in 
prescribed service requirements, together with 
a contract management system that focuses on 
strict compliance with the terms of the contract 
and contract management guidelines rather 
than obtaining employment outcomes for  
job seekers. This is also said to stifle innovation.
 
4 ACCI, Submission to Review of Employment Services, p. 2. 
5 Brotherhood of St Laurence, Sustainable outcomes for disadvantaged job seekers: submission to the Australian 
Government on the Future of Employment Assistance, p. 5.
6 Sarina Russo, Submission to Review of Employment Services, p. 3.
7 Job Seeker Experience of Job Network, Eureka Project, Research commissioned by the Department of 
Employment and Workplace Relations, January 2007.
8 Jobs Australia, Submission to Review of Employment Services, May 2008, p. 5.
9 Sarina Russo, Submission to Review of Employment Services, p. 7.
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Over the last 10 years program guidelines have 
become more prescriptive and rigid as the degree 
of micro-management has grown and innovation 
has been stifled. Contract management has 
increasingly focused on the fine detail of service 
providers’ processes in contrast to the original 
premise of relying on the skills and innovation of 
the private and community sectors. The financial 
cost of this excessive prescription and reporting is 
borne by government and providers and is obvious. 
Less tangible but equally important is the limitation 
on the overall effectiveness of employment services 
attributable to the throttling of innovation.20
Insufficient employer focus
Current settings do not encourage or reward 
providers to focus on labour market shortages 
or the suitability of the job seeker to a particular 
role. There is too little cooperation and 
communication between providers in servicing 
employers. Because of the focus of the existing 
contracts, providers have not always developed 
strong labour market knowledge. 
Industry feedback also suggests that some  
Job Network providers do not have sufficient 
specialised industry knowledge to make a 
satisfactory placement so opportunities for real 
employment outcomes in industry are lost.21
Evaluations also support the value of greater 
employer engagement. Higher performing 
providers have been those who actively work 
with employers to place job seekers into 
vacancies rather than relying on job seekers 
finding their own jobs.22
Inadequate services for remote job seekers
Services for job seekers living in remote areas 
need to be improved. Current arrangements  
in remote areas where ‘bundled’ services are 
delivered alongside mainstream contracts are 
bureaucratic and cumbersome. 
While places can build over time, financial viability 
and the need to have consultants delivering 
different programs under different guidelines and 
compliance requirements mitigate against effective 
delivery and has led to high staff turnover.23
The additional costs of providing services in 
remote locations have not been recognised. 
These flow from additional staffing costs and 
poor infrastructure in many remote areas  
(for example, a lack of housing and transport). 
Remote service fees – these fees do not compensate 
for the exorbitant cost of remote servicing.  
Specific impacting factors include the significant 
down time of consultants that currently cannot be 
drawn down from the JSKA, and the competition 
for staff, particularly in mining towns where  
wages of $75 000+ per annum are common for  
semi-skilled people.24
Under-utilised Job Seeker Account
An evaluation of the JSKA has shown the value 
of a flexible funding pool. However, providers 
do not always target JSKA expenditure and 
interventions purchased to the characteristics  
of job seekers. 25
 
20 Jobs Australia, Submission to Review of Employment Services, p. 6.
2 ACCI, Submission to Review of Employment Services, p. 2.
22 DEWR 2002, Job Network Evaluation Stage Three: Effectiveness Report, EPPB Report /2002, DEWR, Canberra.
23 ITEC, Submission to Review of Employment services, p. 2.
24 ITEC, Submission to Review of Employment Services, p. 2.
25 DEWR 2006, Job Seeker Account Evaluation Report, August 2006.
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Rules surrounding when and how providers 
expend funds from the JSKA are complex and 
too prescriptive. Providers consistently indicate 
that they are extremely cautious using the JSKA 
because of uncertainty about possible recovery 
action as a result of contract management by 
DEEWR. As a consequence the JSKA has been 
consistently under-utilised. 
Unclear guidelines and compliance measures have 
resulted in restricted service and support to job 
seekers with resources such as the Job Seeker 
Account under-utilised.26
The JSKA is also not available to the very 
disadvantaged job seekers in JPET and PSP.
A counter-productive compliance system 
The eight week, non-payment period (for 
repeated or serious participation failures) was 
designed to encourage participation but it is 
counterproductive as job seekers have little or 
no contact with Centrelink or their employment 
services provider for the eight-week period. 
Can’t get to interviews. I lost my mobile because I 
only paid for essential things… [and this] lowered 
my chances of getting a job. The whole period you 
hibernate… they stop looking for a job for you.27
There is also a significant social cost as many 
vulnerable people are not eligible for financial 
case management and therefore are unable  
to pay for necessities such as food or 
accommodation.
The relationship between this penalty and major 
dislocation, including homelessness, relationship 
breakdown, increased mental stress, illness, violence 
and crime is both categorical and direct. 28
The job seeker compliance regime is 
administratively complex, punitive and  
counter-productive. The policy of giving  
job seekers a second chance if they have failed 
to attend a provider interview is reasonable, 
although it is not effective for failure to 
participate in a program, since it allows a  
job seeker to miss up to a fortnight’s 
participation before any action is taken. 
Further, it prevents participation both by removing 
any financial capacity to comply on the part of the 
client, and by the necessary consequential removal 
of activity test requirements for the duration of  
the penalty.29
Performance management 
The current Star Ratings performance 
management system was criticised on the 
grounds that it is complex and lacks 
transparency. It is also said that a narrow focus 
on ‘speed to placement’ rewards short-term 
outcomes, thereby discouraging investment in 
training and skills development. Job Network 
providers also overwhelmingly criticised the 
regular process of business reallocation as 
creating too great a level of uncertainty. 
An emphasis on speed and number of outcomes 
has had the effect of causing providers to focus on 
placement, rather than necessarily the ‘best’ 
placement. In many cases this need for speed has 
also meant that the intensive case management 
support needed to ensure a multiply disadvantaged 
job seeker is adequately prepared for sustainable 
employment does not occur. The result in many 
cases is placement but not sustained placement. 
Churn in job placements has become a feature of 
the marketplace – a feature that does little to assist 
job seekers or employers.30
 
26 NESA, Submission to Review of Employment Services, p. 8.
27 Eight week non-payment period an exploratory qualitative report prepared by the Open Mind Research Group on 
behalf of DEEWR, May 2008 quote from female job seeker aged 27.
28 National Welfare Rights Network, Submission to Review of Employment Services, p. 3.
29 National Welfare Rights Network, Submission to Review of Employment Services, p. 3.
30 UnitingCare Australia, Submission to Review of Employment Services, p. 25.
Page 0 of 39
The Information Technology system
Many stakeholders are critical of DEEWR  
IT systems (EA3000) and in particular, its 
complexity and poor functionality. It is said to 
inhibit their capacity to effectively service  
job seekers and that it imposes additional 
administrative burden by requiring them to 
continuously ‘work around’ the system. 
Another crucial issue in this context of your review  
is the critical need to reform the system so that is 
designed around the needs of the many hundred  
of thousands of people it affects, rather than a 
ridiculously complex set of contractual and other 
rules and business process models and information 
technology systems which constrain the people 
working at the front line and limit their ability to 
exercise their judgement and use discretion in the 
practice of engaging and working effectively with 
disadvantaged people.31
Through the Review of Employment Services 
several stakeholders, including the NESA,32 have 
also argued that the electronic auto-matching 
functionality does not work. Many of the  
job matches are extremely poor, job seekers  
do not follow them up, and the system does 
little to contribute to employment outcomes.
Current system New system
Poorly targeted assistance Redistributing assistance to the most highly 
disadvantaged and wider access to the EPF
Continuum too rigid An EPP based on the needs of the individual job seeker
Lack of incentives for skills and training 
in areas of skills shortages
Bonus on outcomes achieved after accredited training 
and 238 000 training places
Employment services too complex 
and fragmented
Combining seven contracts into one
Excessive red tape Streamlined programs and simplified EPF administrative 
arrangements
Insufficient employer focus Higher outcome payments for provider brokered 
outcomes and creation of specialist employer brokers
Inadequate services for remote  
job seekers
.7 multiplier for service fees and EPF to reflect broader 
definition of outcomes to encourage further education 
Under-utilised JSA More flexible use of EPF
A counterproductive  
compliance system
More work like compliance system based on  
‘No Show, No Pay’
Performance management  Streamlined contract management and monitoring 
based on a Charter of Contract Management  
(to be developed with providers)
Unsuitable IT system IT system to be rebuilt in consultation with users
 
3 Jobs Australia, Submission to Review of Employment Services, pp. 2 3.
32 NESA, Submission to Review of Employment Services, p. 4.
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Chapter 2—A Fresh Approach
The new employment services system aims to 
deliver ‘work ready’ job seekers into the labour 
market particularly in areas of labour shortages. 
Employment service providers will assist job 
seekers to develop an individualised pathway  
to employment – the EPP– drawing on a mix of 
vocational and non-vocational activities, with a 
particular focus on developing the skills needed 
by employers, or for self-employment. It will 
include a combination of appropriate job search 
requirements, work experience and training.  
The level of assistance to be provided to job 
seekers will better reflect their level of 
disadvantage. The EPF will be available for a 
broad range of training, services, wage 
assistance and other practical support.
Mutual obligation will be retained with a more 
work-like ‘No show, No pay’ compliance system 
and job seekers required to adhere to the terms 
of their plan or attendance at WfD or another 
work experience activity.33
Centrelink’s role
Job seekers will be placed into one of four 
streams by Centrelink using the JSCI34 and, 
where needed, a JCA35. The JCA will continue to 
be delivered by job capacity assessors including 
Centrelink. Centrelink will continue to register 
job seekers and refer them to an employment 
service provider as soon as possible. 
In addition to any requirements imposed as part 
of the job seeker’s EPP, most job seekers will be 
required to have fortnightly contact with 
Centrelink for the purpose of activating income 
support payments. This will occur face-to-face 
except where special issues like remoteness or 
poor transport availability make contact by 
phone or other means more practical.  
Active job seekers with a good compliance 
history may have less frequent contact.
Operation of the new employment 
services 
Stream 1 – ‘work ready’ job seekers
Job seekers who are considered ‘work ready’  
will be immediately assisted in the preparation 
of a résumé and will be advised about local 
labour market opportunities and on job search 
methods. It is expected that up to a third of 
these job seekers will find employment in their 
first three months, without further assistance. 
After three months, if the job seeker has not 
found work, providers will assess the job seeker’s 
present skills and opportunities for further 
training (a ‘skills assessment’). Job seekers will 
also be required to participate in an approved 
’intensive activity’ of 60 hours over a fortnight. 
This activity will be relevant to the job seeker 
and designed to improve their ability to obtain 
or sustain employment. Activities could include 
development of job seekers’ job search 
techniques, referral to training including through 
the Productivity Places program or work 
experience placements.
At this point a small credit will be available in  
the EPF to assist with costs. After the skills 
assessment has occurred, if the job seeker 
obtains employment, a job placement fee  
will be payable. 
 
33 Appendix  provides a diagrammatic overview of the new employment services model.
34 A review of the JSCI is underway. The terms of the review are outlined in Appendix 2.
35 A review of the JCA is underway. Details about the review are outlined in Appendix 3.
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Between three and 2 months, it is expected 
that the employment service provider will 
maintain regular contact with the job seeker and 
that the job seeker will have clear job search 
requirements. These contacts would be aimed 
at ensuring the job seeker remains focused on 
looking for work that is appropriate to their skills 
and the needs of the local labour market. 
Reporting of job search for the purposes of 
activating income support payments will 
continue to occur at Centrelink. 
If, after 2 months, the job seeker has not found 
employment, they may be reassessed and 
moved to an alternate stream, or they will be 
required to participate in WfD or another work 
experience activity (see discussion at page 3). 
This may occur later than 2 months if the job 
seeker has been involved in training (see 
discussion at page 5). 
Current Job Search Support Only job seekers
Job seekers who in the current system are 
defined as JSSO job seekers will be eligible to 
receive assistance with a résumé and local 
labour market advice. JSSO job seekers will not 
attract a job placement fee.
Job Placement Licensed Organisations  
and Auto-job matching 
Changed labour market conditions, and the 
need for the Government to be financially 
responsible, mean that the Government needs 
to focus its efforts on the most disadvantaged 
job seekers, those who are hardest to help.  
As a result, JPLO arrangements do not form  
a part of the new system 
Auto-job matching will also be discontinued.  
It adds little value to current services as job 
seekers are not always matched appropriately  
to vacancies. Consistent with the approach in 
the new model – assistance tailored to the 
individual needs of job seekers – the expertise 
of providers in developing the skills and abilities 
of job seekers and then securing a placement in 
a job that matches those skills and abilities,  
will be the way job seekers gain employment. 
Streams 2, 3 and 4 – job seekers with  
a longer pathway to employment
It is expected that job seekers in streams 2, 3 and 
4 may take longer and require more assistance to 
obtain employment. Job seekers in these streams 
will develop their EPP with their employment 
service provider immediately. The level of 
resources available to assist job seekers, through 
the combination of service fees, job placement 
fees, outcome fees and credits to the EPF, increase 
in accordance with the job seekers’ level of 
disadvantage (see Appendix 4).
Other key design features of these streams are:
The JSCI will determine entry into  
streams 2 and 3. 
A JCA will generally determine entry into 
stream 4 (arrangements will be made to 
accommodate direct registration of some  
job seekers, for example, homeless youth).
For job seekers with non-vocational as well as 
vocational barriers to employment, the new 
structure allows for parallel or sequential 
interventions to address these barriers.



Discussion point 1:
In addition to the development of  
job seekers’ job search techniques,  
training and work experience, are there 
other activities that should be approved  
as an ‘intensive activity’? 
How should we best balance the need to 
ensure a job seeker receives assistance 
appropriate to their needs with the 
provider’s responsibility to manage funds 
cost effectively across their case load?  
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Participation in streams 2 and 3 will be for up 
to 2 months, although it may be longer if 
the job seeker has been involved in training 
(see discussion at page 5).
Participation in stream 4 will be for up to  
8 months, with an assessment at 2 months 
to determine the likelihood of the job seeker 
benefiting from the further six months  
of assistance. 
At the conclusion of a stream if job seekers 
have not found employment, they may be 
re-assessed and move to an alternate stream, 
or they will be required to participate in  
WfD or another work experience activity  
(see discussion on this page). 
Movement between streams
Movement between the four streams will not 
be based on a rigid continuum but determined 
by individual need, as measured by the JSCI 
(and JCA where applicable):
Job seekers will only move to a more intensive 
stream if their level of disadvantage increases.
Job seekers who complete a stream will 
participate in work experience including WfD.




Job seekers who have completed a stream 
will not be able to re-enter that stream during 
their current period of unemployment.  
Job seekers who leave income support for  
3 weeks or more but become unemployed 
again will re-qualify for a full range of 
assistance, based on an up-to-date JSCI.
Job seekers may be re-assessed at any time 
during participation in a stream if their 
circumstances change, and move to another 
stream if appropriate. 
WfD, Green Corps and other work 
experience 
As a means of helping the job seeker secure 
ongoing employment, WfD (including full-time 
WfD) and Green Corps will remain an integral part 
of the new employment services system, along 
with other forms of work experience (for example, 
paid work in an intermediate labour market or 
social enterprise). Brokered placements in 
organisations as well as project activities will be 
possible. It will also be possible to ‘blend’  
part-time work or training and work experience. 
WfD, or an alternative work experience activity, 
will be the primary intervention for job seekers 
who complete streams , 2, 3 or 4 and who are 
not moved into another stream (see discussion 
on this page). At the same time the job seeker 
will continue to be supported to look for work 
with two-monthly contact with their provider. 
Outcome payments will continue to be paid for 
employment achieved by job seekers in this 
phase. Unlike the present WfD arrangements, this 
means providers will have a financial incentive to 


Discussion point 2: 
Employment service providers will be 
given flexibility to determine the frequency 
of their contacts and other activities in 
accordance with the needs of the job 
seeker. However, to ensure a reasonable 
level of service, providers will be expected 
to meet regularly with job seekers and this 
will be reflected in the job seeker’s EPP. 
Should there be a minimum contact 
requirement? For example, should 
providers need to meet with job seekers  
at least once per month?  
Discussion point 3: 
What are the practical administrative  
issues that will need to be resolved in  
order to ensure the streams are as effective 
as possible? 
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structure their work experience activities to focus 
on the skills required by employers in the local 
labour market. Providers will be funded to deliver 
work experience activities with a service fee and 
an amount credited to the EPF (see Appendix 4) 
as job seekers move from an earlier stream into 
work experience.
In addition, providers can purchase work 
experience for any job seeker at any time using 
the EPF. 
The CWC and Green Corps contracts will come 
under the new ESC. This will remove the present 
complexity in referring job seekers between  
Job Network and WfD or Green Corps. The Green 
Corps Allowance will not continue and job 
seekers participating in Green Corps projects will 
receive an income support payment if eligible. 
Access to Green Corps projects will be widened 
to include job seekers of any working age. 
Employment Pathway Fund
The EPF provides a resource to support a  
job seeker’s EPP. It will be easier to use than the 
JSKA, and will support a broader range of 
assistance. The EPF will be available to more  
job seekers in the new system, reflecting their 
level of disadvantage.36 Currently, providers can 
only access the JSKA for job seekers in the  
Job Network and not those in other programs. 
The proposed EPF will be used for a broader 
range of assistance. This will include vocational 
and non-vocational interventions, training and 
skills development, self-employment, mentoring, 
or work experience activities. Assistance will not 
be required to be ‘directly’ tied to a specific job, 
but will still be required to contribute to the job 
seeker obtaining employment. 
It is expected that in relevant cases, the EPF will 
be used to facilitate self-employment with the 
purchase of business mentoring and other 
assistance. However NEIS, as a stand alone 
program, will cease to exist. NEIS providers will 
be able to provide services as part of the new 
model but under the umbrella of an 
employment services provider who provides 
the full range of services.
Prohibited expenditure could be in accordance 
with a principles-based approach. For example, 
items which may have an adverse impact on 
public safety, occupational health and safety or 
the reputation of the employment services system 
would be prohibited. This is different to the 
current system which requires an exhaustive list.
Rules governing the EPF will be those necessary 
to ensure the appropriate use of taxpayer  
funds. The current dollar limits on small-scale 
purchases with streamlined evidentiary 
requirements will be increased. 
The current complex array of principles and 
guidelines will be reduced with the rules 
governing EPF being included as part of the 
contract. The EPF will be governed by the  
new approach to contract management 
outlined at page 20.
 
36 Except JSSO job seekers, see further p. 2
Discussion point 4: 
What should and should not be able to be 
purchased with the EPF? 
Which is preferable, a principles-based 
approach to prohibited items or an 
exhaustive list of prohibited items?
Is there anything about the proposed  
EPF that may contribute to it being  
under-utilised?
At what level should purchases be 
permitted on the basis of a simple invoice 
and without the need for detailed  
case-by-case justification?
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Improving employer focus
The new employment services system will stress 
the importance of focusing on employers to 
ensure job seekers are best placed to meet their 
needs. Prospective providers will be assessed 
during the tender process on their employer 
engagement strategy.
Outcome payments will be weighted to reflect 
the importance of providers engaging with 
employers, with employment outcomes related 
to vacancies secured by a provider attracting a 
higher payment. The performance 
management framework will also reward 
responsiveness to employer needs.
Funding of $6 million over three years will be 
allocated to allow employers, groups of 
employers, employer organisations, unions or 
other organisations to tender to become 
employer brokers. This initiative aims to build on 
some of the more successful employer demand 
projects of recent years where a broker with 
strong links to the employer community  
in a particular sector or region has helped  
co-ordinate and target the efforts of 
employment service providers in liaison with 
individual employers, training providers or other 
stakeholders to secure sustainable employment 
for disadvantaged job seekers. 
The funding will allow brokers to be put in place 
in different locations and industries, particularly 
where skill or labour shortages are apparent and 
there are opportunities for job seekers to secure 
sustainable employment. Interested groups will 
have an opportunity to make submissions 
seeking the available funds. Clear employment 
targets will form part of the contractual 
arrangement that will be put in place between 
the broker and the Commonwealth. 
The brokers will be required to identify what 
support and funding their organisation will 
provide to supplement Commonwealth funding.
These measures ensure the new system  
has a strong focus on matching the needs  
of job seekers with the labour requirements  
of employers.
Encouraging skills and training 
The Productivity Places program provides new 
training places in skills employers want and is 
designed to help people secure employment. 
The program is part of the Australian 
Government’s ‘Skilling Australia for the Future’ 
initiative. The Government has allocated  
630 000 training places over five years to ensure 
that Australians develop the skills that industry 
needs. The training places will be delivered in 
an industry-driven system, ensuring that training 
is more responsive to the needs of enterprises 
and individuals. Of the total training places,  
238 000 are for people returning to the 
workforce, including job seekers, at a cost  
of over $880 million. 
The Government believes there is considerable 
scope for better linkages and increased referrals 
from employment services to apprenticeships 
and vocational education and training, 
particularly in areas of skill shortages.  
The proposed new employment services model 
will encourage greater take up of apprenticeships, 
improve connections between employment 
services and vocational education and training, 
and develop linkages with state and territory 
government employment and training programs. 
A bonus of 20 per cent will be paid for an 
employment outcome where the job seeker has 
completed an appropriate accredited training 
course relevant to the needs of the local labour 
market (including through the Productivity Places 
program) or has secured a 3 or 26 week 
outcome in an apprenticeship in an occupational 
area of skill shortage. Education outcomes will 
continue to be payable for the completion of at 
least one semester of a two-semester course.
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The performance measurement arrangements 
for employment services will also need to 
support and encourage referral of job seekers  
to appropriate skills and foundational training, 
including the Language, Literacy and Numeracy 
Program and the Australian Apprenticeship 
Access Program. 
Job seeker choice and voice
The new employment services system will 
provide a better service and more choice for  
job seekers. Greater job seeker involvement in 
designing their pathway to employment is 
expected to increase the job seekers’ 
motivation, and hence their chance of  
obtaining employment. 
Real user choice can also create incentives to 
keep improving the quality of employment 
services. Consequently, the Government will be 
looking to incorporate job seeker feedback into 
the performance management system, and into 
provider choice. 
Under the current arrangements, job seekers 
can only choose their provider upon initial 
registration, a point in time that they may have 
little or no information about the provider.  
The current system imposes restrictions on the 
ability to change employment service providers 
after that time. The initial choice is constrained 
by limited availability of information upon 
which to base a decision. 
Options for consideration to provide job seekers 
a stronger voice include allowing them to move 
to another provider during an initial ‘cooling off 
period’ or at some later point if the job seeker 
and provider are unable to determine a 
reasonable and constructive servicing 
arrangement. Under either scenario, job seekers 
may be constrained to one change of provider 
(other than for relocation reasons) during a spell 
of unemployment to discourage frequent 
chopping and changing. 
In addition, to provide scope for job seeker 
choice to play a stronger part in operation of 
the model, greater business share tolerances 
may be allowed.37 In the current Job Network 
model, if a provider has more than 20 per cent 
of their market share on their case load, they 
can no longer accept job seekers who may 
choose to be serviced by them.
Fee structure and payment system
The indicative fee structure is outlined at 
Appendix 4. Outcome fees are structured to 
reflect the relative disadvantage of job seekers. 
Hourly rates underlying the service fee structure 
are derived from existing hourly rates in the 
current contracts. In some cases these are higher 
than the hourly rates currently paid (for example, 
the proposed hourly rate for stream 4 is higher 
than that currently paid to PSP providers) while 
in other cases direct comparisons are more 
difficult. For example, the hourly rate for 
servicing stream 2 job seekers is set at a higher 
rate than currently applies to non-highly 
disadvantaged job seekers, but lower than that 
applicable to highly disadvantaged job seekers. 
It should be borne in mind that providers will 
have considerable discretion, together with the 
job seeker, to determine how best to meet the 
job seeker’s needs. 
Stakeholder views are invited on the construction 
of the new payment structure. A variety of 
payment models are currently in operation across 
the various contractual arrangements. It is 
proposed that outcome fees would simply be 
Discussion point 5:
How can the legitimate interests of a job 
seeker to choose a service provider be 
balanced with the need to provide 
certainty for providers?
 
37 Business share is the proportion of eligible job seekers in an Employment Services Area who register with 
Centrelink as looking for work and who are subsequently referred to the provider. 
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paid on the attainment of outcomes and EPF 
payments would be credited to the fund as job 
seekers enter the relevant stream. 
The payment of service fees raises more complex 
issues. It is proposed that payments would be 
made to providers in advance on either a six-
monthly or quarterly basis. The calculation of 
these payments would need to anticipate the 
number of job seekers in each stream, and the 
hourly rate payable for servicing the job seekers. 
However, as some job seekers will find 
employment or otherwise exit the provider’s case 
load during the period for which an up-front 
payment is made, a downward adjustment is 
needed to ensure that providers are not  
over-compensated for providing a service.  
For example, it would not be appropriate to 
provide 00 per cent of a service fee for  
00 per cent of the job seekers, if the fee is based 
on six months worth of service and a percentage 
of the job seekers do not ultimately receive  
six months’ worth of service. It is also desirable,  
in the interests of minimising red tape, to avoid 
complex fee acquittal arrangements. 
Participation requirements for job seekers
The Government remains committed to mutual 
obligation. As is presently the case, job seekers 
will be required to participate in activities in 
accordance with their EPP. Job seekers who fail 
to comply with the requirements will be subject 
to a stringent compliance regime.39 
Discussion point 6: 
Are there any further improvements that 
can be suggested to deriving and paying 
service fees? Are there alternatives to claw 
back mechanisms?
How should fees be shaped to  
discourage parking?38
 
38 In the Productivity Commission’s report of their review of Job Network, parking is referred to as the (ongoing) 
provision of little assistance to disadvantaged job seekers. See section 9.3 Productivity Commission 2002, 
Independent Review of Job Network, Inquiry Report, Report No. 2, 3 June, Canberra.
39 See Chapter 3.
Discussion point 7:
Should activity test requirements be made 
more flexible and responsive to job seekers’ 
needs? If so, how?
The Government has already acted to 
ensure that job seekers participating in 
approved training are no longer forced to 
accept work that would interfere with that 
training. Are there other areas in which a 
similar approach should be adopted?
Should job seekers with recognised 
qualifications or skills be permitted to 
restrict their job search to their chosen field 
for a period? If so, for how long, and in 
what circumstances?
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Participation requirements for parents 
The Government is committed to ensuring that 
parents have the same opportunities to 
participate in employment that other job 
seekers do. We recognise the critical importance 
to the Australian economy of ensuring that all 
those who can work do work. In relation to 
parents the Government will ensure that 
participation requirements are balanced with 
parenting responsibilities, which have 
independent social and economic benefits.  
A number of issues have been raised in the 
course of consultations including: 
whether job search requirements can  
take account of long school holidays, 
particularly when the job seeker is  
employed at other times
whether participation requirements can 
better take account of participation that 
includes a combination of work, study and 
volunteering activities
whether activity reporting requirements  
can be improved.
Issues relating to the participation requirements 
for parents were raised in numerous 
submissions. The Government will therefore be 
establishing a taskforce to examine whether 
there are better ways of balancing the role 
parents play in their families and communities, 
with the need to increase participation among 
child-bearing aged women (Australia is 
presently ranked 2st out of 30 in the OECD  
in this category).



Participation requirements for mature age 
job seekers
Under current arrangements, job seekers who 
are 55 or more years of age (regardless of 
whether they are also principal carer parents or 
people with partial work capacity) are taken to 
satisfy the activity test if they undertake 30 or 
more hours of approved voluntary work, paid 
work or a combination of approved voluntary 
and paid work in a fortnight. Job seekers 
meeting their activity test requirements through 
the above means will not have any job search 
requirements. As part of these arrangements, 
mature age job seekers are required to remain 
connected with an employment service 
provider. The Participation Taskforce will also be 
looking at issues in relation to mature age 
participation including access to training.
Indigenous Australians and remote servicing
The new employment services system will make 
a key contribution to the goal of halving the gap 
in Indigenous employment outcomes within a 
decade. The greater flexibility in the new model 
will better support skills acquisition, mentoring, 
and any locally developed innovative solutions to 
employment. In remote areas there will be 
placement and outcome payments for a broader 
range of educational and foundation skills 
outcomes including helping Indigenous job 
seekers to return to school and gain greater 
literacy and numeracy skills.
Services operating in remote communities will 
also be able to explore alternative community 
enterprises, in addition to WfD. 
The higher service delivery costs in remote 
locations resulting from infrastructure and 
staffing difficulties and the significant 
disadvantage of job seekers in the labour 
market will be addressed by the application of a 
.7 multiplier to service fees and the EPF 
compared to non-remote locations. 
Tenders for remote services will be assessed in 
part on how they intend to deliver services on 
the ground and to maximise community 
Discussion point 8: 
How can the needs of parents returning to 
the workforce be balanced with the need 
for greater employment participation? 
Should volunteering be incorporated into 
participation requirements for parents?
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involvement and capacity building. Providers 
will also be assessed on how they intend to 
utilise the local workforce.
The new approach to employment services in 
remote areas is only one element in addressing 
Indigenous economic participation. The 
development of a new Indigenous Economic 
Development Strategy has commenced. As a first 
stage, consultations on reforms to CDEP and IEP 
will be held concurrently with consultations on 
the new employment services model. 
More details of the consultations and a 
discussion paper are available: 
at www.workplace.gov.au/ESpurchasing or 
www.indigenous.gov.au 
by emailing feedback@indigenous.gov.au
by telephoning 300 733 54.
Innovation Fund
Providers will be able to tender to deliver 
projects through a $4 million innovation fund. 
Priority will be given to projects that offer  
place-based solutions to address barriers  
to employment for groups of highly 
disadvantaged job seekers including, 
Indigenous Australians, the homeless and those 
at risk of homelessness, those with mental 
illness, and people in areas with entrenched 
disadvantage, including job seekers in jobless 
families. Projects will be evaluated in part on 
their capacity to work with other services  
(for example, health or housing), and their ability 
to form partnerships with the private sector and 
training organisations.



Flexibility will be maximised to ensure 
innovation has the capacity to flourish. 
Examples of projects which might be funded 
could include: mentoring groups of job seekers 
with specific disadvantage; the establishment of 
social enterprises; projects to link disadvantaged 
workers with areas of skill shortage; and 
initiatives to physically link workers in regional 
locations where employers have positions 
available but job seekers are unable to access 
them because of the lack of transport.
Proposals will be sought as part of the Request 
for Tender and approved projects will be funded 
through extensions to the main contract under 
which providers will operate. Not all funds will be 
committed in the first year of the contract to 
allow time to determine if new projects should 
be funded during the contract period.
Harvest Labour 
Similar to the arrangements for the innovation 
projects, providers in areas where out-of-area 
harvest workers are required will be able to 
tender to deliver a harvest service to primary 
producers. Proposals will be assessed on value-
for-money grounds, including by considering 
whether there is a strong case for a harvest 
provider in the particular location. 
Discussion point 9: 
How can universal employment services 
be better integrated with CDEP and IEP?
Discussion point 10:
How can best practice be disseminated to 
encourage adoption elsewhere? 
How should the success of innovation 
projects be judged?
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Performance management 
The Minister for Employment Participation has 
asked DEEWR to establish an external reference 
group to provide advice on an appropriate 
performance system, in the period leading up to 
the publication of the Exposure Draft request for 
tender. The aim is that such a system should be 
simpler and more transparent than that which 
currently exists, but it should still promote 
continuous improvement. Some providers 
proposed that a benchmarking system might 
form a preferable alternative approach to the 
Star Ratings system. Under such a system, 
providers would know in advance how many 
job seekers they have to place in work in order 
to ensure a satisfactory rating. Other suggestions 
have included the adoption of a benchmark for 
the most disadvantaged job seekers, in addition 
to the current Star Ratings system to enable  
a step change in outcomes.
Any new approach should ensure that valid 
comparisons can be made, and that appropriate 
emphasis is placed on skills development and 
training, the needs of employers and sustainable 
outcomes. 
Stakeholder views are therefore invited on the 
development of this work. 
Business reallocation 
In order to facilitate greater planning and 
investment by providers, business will only be 
reallocated once during the life of the contract, 
unless there are exceptional circumstances that 
justify a further reallocation (for example, if a 
provider has flagrantly or fraudulently breached 
the contract, or if a provider closes down). 
Contract management 
DEEWR will aim to model its contract 
management practices in a way that strikes the 
right balance between its need to ensure 
taxpayer funds are spent efficiently, effectively 
and ethically, so as to obtain value for money; 
and the need to ensure that providers are not 
unnecessarily burdened by the activities or 
processes that DEEWR uses to undertake that 
monitoring. 
DEEWR is developing a new approach to 
contract management and monitoring that 
focuses on the objective that it shares with 
providers: delivering to job seekers the services 
they need. This will involve a partnership with 
providers focusing on maximising performance 
within a flexible service delivery framework.  
The management of the new EPF and the 
regime of contacts with job seekers are two 
areas where greater flexibility will be available to 
providers than has been the case in the past. 
Reduced contractual complexity will mean that 
there are fewer matters that DEEWR will need to 
actively monitor on a regular basis. 
In addition, DEEWR’s approach to contract 
management will be guided by a Charter of 
Contract Management, to be developed in 
consultation with providers and agreed to by 
the Minister, which will set out the minimum 
standards of performance and conduct that 
providers can expect of DEEWR. This will assist 
in ensuring that DEEWR aims to provide 
Discussion point 11: 
If a benchmark was adopted, how would it 
be set? Would each provider’s benchmark 
be the same, or would it differ based on 
the make-up of their case load or the 
nature of their labour market? 
How could the interests of the hardest to 
place be advanced by the performance 
management system?
How can the experience of job seekers and 
employers best be included when 
assessing the performance of providers?
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consistent and timely advice through its 
network of contract managers to providers, and 
it will include agreed processes for resolving 
differences of opinion that may arise before 
formal contractual dispute resolution 
procedures are invoked.
What will the new contract look like?
Proposed features of the new ESC include:
All providers will, on their own or in 
partnership, be required to provide all 
required assistance to streams , 2, 3 and 4, 
and access to work experience. Partnerships 
will need to be specified in the tender 
application.
Providers will be able to provide services to 
specialist cohorts: for example CALD, 
Indigenous, young people or ex-offenders.
Tendering and contracting will continue to 
be undertaken on the basis of geographical 
areas. A review of the current Employment 
Service Areas will be undertaken so these 
areas better reflect natural labour markets 
and align more closely to ABS statistical areas. 



To streamline the tender submission process 
for both tenderers and DEEWR, while also 
allowing service providers to work on their 
tender submissions until much later than in 
the past, electronic submission of tenders will 
occur via the Australian Government’s 
procurement information system, AusTender. 
Electronic submission will require only limited 
internet connectivity (i.e. dialup connection is 
sufficient) and will be a straightforward, 
structured process that will assist 
employment service providers to develop 
and submit their tender application.

Discussion point 12:
How should ESAs be determined and how 
can they be aligned more closely with 
natural labour markets?
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Chapter 3—A More Effective Compliance Framework
In line with community attitudes, the 
Government believes that everyone who can 
work should work and that job seekers who 
receive income support must look for work and 
participate in employment programs or training 
to help them find a job. The great majority of 
job seekers comply with these requirements, 
but we need a more effective compliance 
system for those who do not meet their 
requirements.
The current framework has failed to prevent 
non-compliance. There were 30 000 penalties 
imposed in the first eight months of 2007–08; 
double the number in the entire preceding year. 
An effective system should result in fewer eight 
week, non-payment penalties because job 
seekers would be meeting their requirements.
The current system is also counter-productive. 
When an eight week non-payment penalty is 
imposed the job seeker is not required to have 
any contact with their Job Network provider, or 
Centrelink, for the entire period. The current 
system is perceived by many providers and 
welfare agencies as a ‘penalise first’ approach 
that prevents employment service providers 
using their professional judgment. Submissions 
suggested that by stopping payment for eight 
weeks the current system places job seekers, 
particularly already vulnerable job seekers,  
at great risk. It arguably ends up costing the 
community in other ways, through the health 
and welfare system, and requiring charitable 
organisations to provide support.
New compliance framework – 
description
The proposed new compliance framework will be 
more ‘work like’. If a job seeker does not turn up 
for their activity or program on any day,  
they will lose that day’s income support under a  
‘No Show, No Pay’ policy. For failure to attend 
interviews the eight week non-payment period 
will remain for wilfully and persistently non-
compliant job seekers. However, rather than 
automatic escalation in penalty after three failures, 
job seekers will receive a comprehensive 
compliance assessment to determine whether an 
eight week non-payment period is appropriate.
The onus will be on job seekers to continue to 
look for work and participate in intensive 
employment programs or training in order to 
have their income support reinstated. 
Aspects of the current compliance framework 
that will be retained are:
Rapid reconnection following any missed 
appointment with a provider or employer will 
give job seekers the opportunity to avoid a 
financial penalty.
Job seekers who voluntarily leave a job 
without good reason will not be entitled to 
income support40.
Job seekers referred to a JCA, but who do 
not attend, may have their payments held to 
secure attendance at a JCA; but will not incur 
a penalty for failure to attend.



 
40 Job seekers provide an employment separation certificate to Centrelink when claiming income support after 
leaving a job. Where the certificate indicates that the job seeker left employment voluntarily Centrelink seeks the 
job seeker’s views to verify the situation. Where a job seeker indicates they did not leave voluntarily, Centrelink may 
discuss this with employer also. Based on these inquiries, Centrelink then makes a decision about the 
circumstances of the employment separation. This decision is subject to appeal. Note, Centrelink may provide the 
job seeker with information about other avenues they can pursue regarding the conditions of their employment 
and subsequent separation.
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‘No Show, No Pay’ – Failure to participate  
in a program or activity 
Under a ‘No Show, No Pay’ approach, job seekers 
will be penalised with the loss of a day’s payment 
for any day they fail to participate fully in a 
program or activity without an acceptable reason. 
Loss of payment will also apply for misconduct 
while in attendance at a program. Job seekers  
will be advised of this in advance of the 
commencement of their activity (and will be 
reminded throughout their activity). It is intended 
the penalty will apply to the payment that is due 
for the period in which the failure occurred.
A participation report will not be submitted if a 
job seeker advises their provider in advance that 
they will not be able to attend a program or 
activity and/or gives an acceptable reason. For 
example, it would be reasonable for a job seeker 
to be absent for a day because of an illness, 
accident, or to attend to an urgent personal 
matter. In the interests of developing good work 
habits, job seekers should be expected to notify 
providers of an impending absence, wherever 
this is known. In some programs or activities it 
may be reasonable to expect the job seeker to 
make up the lost time. Clear guidelines will be 
developed to assist providers determine 
whether to submit a participation report and 
whether time missed should be made up. 
Employment (verified by declared earnings), 
approved study and illness verified by a medical 
certificate will be considered as acceptable 
reasons for absences from the job seeker’s 
activity without time needing to be made up. 
Decisions of providers will be reviewable to 
ensure appropriate considerations were taken 
into account.
A history of ‘No Show, No Pay’ penalties over a 
specified period will trigger a comprehensive 
compliance assessment.
Failure to attend an appointment with an 
employment service provider or employer 
– rapid reconnection averts penalty
As is presently the case, a job seeker who misses 
an appointment with a provider can avoid a 
financial penalty by attending a reconnection 
appointment with that same provider as soon as 
possible. A job seeker who fails to attend a job 
interview or fails to behave appropriately during 
a job interview (with the clear intention of not 
being offered the job) will also be required to 
reconnect with their provider and will not incur 
a penalty if they do so. 
Initial reconnection appointments will be made 
within 48 hours of the job seeker’s contact with 
Centrelink. If the job seeker attends, no penalty 
will apply, although a failure will be recorded.  
If the job seeker does not attend without a 
reasonable excuse they will lose payment from 
the time they contact Centrelink until they do 
reconnect. If the initial reconnection 
appointment cannot be made within 48 hours 
of the job seeker’s contact with Centrelink, no 
financial penalty will apply. Wherever possible, 
the penalty will apply to the payment that is 
due for the period in which the failure to 
reconnect occurred.
It is proposed that a job seeker who accesses 
rapid reconnection three times in 2 months  
be referred for a comprehensive compliance 
assessment. 
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Eight week non-payment period for 
persistently non-compliant job seekers
Job seekers who persistently fail to meet their 
requirements will still be subject to an  
eight week non-payment period. However, 
rather than an automatic escalation in the 
severity of the penalty, as is presently the case, a 
comprehensive compliance assessment will take 
place to determine whether a penalty should be 
applied or whether the job seeker may need 
additional assistance in order to comply. The 
assessment will be conducted by Centrelink, 
who will be required to consider the job seeker’s 
compliance history, employment record and any 
other relevant information provided by the 
provider. A provider can also request that 
Centrelink conduct an assessment at any time.
Possible outcomes of this assessment  
will include:
cancellation of payment and an eight week 
non-payment period. The penalty will only 
be lifted on commencement of a specified 
intensive activity, such as a compulsory 50 
hours per fortnight work experience, training 
or job search program, lasting eight weeks
referral for further assessment where the job 
seekers capacity to comply is in doubt
referral to an appropriate alternative service for 
job seekers who are no longer able to 
participate in their current program or activity
no further action where there is a reasonable 
explanation for the job seeker’s past failures 
and their recent compliance record is good.




Eligibility for income support
Job seekers will continue to have to wait eight 
weeks before payment if they:
voluntarily leave suitable employment 
without a reasonable excuse
behave in such a way at work that they are 
dismissed from suitable employment; or
refuse a suitable job offer while in receipt of 
income support. 
In the first two situations, a person who has  
not yet claimed income support will not be 
eligible for payment until eight weeks after  
the date they became unemployed (which will 
allow them to ‘self serve’ the period prior to  
claiming payment).
A job seeker who is already in receipt of 
payment, who is working, and who engages in 
any of this behaviour, will have their payment 
cancelled and will not be eligible for payment 
for eight weeks.
The eight weeks will be waived for individuals 
who agree to undertake a defined intensive 
activity for 200 hours over the eight weeks  
(50 hours per fortnight) including training or 
work experience (or a lesser amount for people 
with part-time requirements). If a person is 
unable to undertake intensive activities these 
could be waived if the person is in hardship or 
alternative activities prescribed. Accordingly, 
there will be no need to retain the current 
Financial Case Management Scheme. Financial 
Case Management is flawed because it does not 
require job seekers to look for work or undertake 
training through the penalty period; and 
because it is not accessible to many 
disadvantaged job seekers. 



Page 25 of 39
New compliance framework –
discussion
Under current participation reporting and 
compliance arrangements, both employment 
service providers and Centrelink are required to 
contact the job seeker to discuss the job seeker’s 
reasons for failing to meet a requirement before 
any action can be taken, consistent with 
principles of natural justice. This can result in 
delays and duplication of effort. An alternative 
approach would be for providers to contact job 
seekers prior to submitting Participation Reports.
Centrelink would still be responsible for making 
the decision under Social Security Law, but 
would only contact the job seeker if they 
needed to do so in order to make an informed 
decision. This approach would require the 
provider to submit a comprehensive 
Participation Report. Providers would be given 
clear guidelines about allowable absences to 
reduce the number of unnecessary Participation 
Reports. It is also proposed that providers will 
have greater discretion not to submit 
Participation Reports, for example where they 
are satisfied with the job seeker’s explanation for 
their absence or where they believe it will assist 
the job seeker’s chances of obtaining 
employment.
While the counter-productive ‘three strikes and 
you’re out’ approach of the current harsh regime 
will no longer apply (because an assessment will 
replace an ‘automatic’ non-payment), there is 
still a need to define persistent non-compliance 
and establish a level of non-compliance that 
triggers an assessment. It is proposed that three 
failures to attend an appointment with a 
provider or a job interview should trigger a 
comprehensive compliance assessment, while a 
consistent record of ‘No show, No pay’ failures in 
a specified period (perhaps six months) could 
also trigger an assessment. 
Discussion point 13:
Should both Centrelink and employment 
service providers be required to contact 
job seekers about Participation Reports?
Discussion point 14:
Remembering that the comprehensive 
compliance assessment is an opportunity 
to identify barriers or service options, what 
number of Participation Reports submitted 
in a particular time-frame should trigger an 
assessment?
Should the trigger be the same for rapid 
reconnection failures as for ‘No show, No 
pay’ failures?
Discussion point 15:
What should happen if the job seeker re-
engages through participation in an 
intensive activity but then again fails to 
meet their requirements (a persistent no 
show)? Should payment be lost on a ‘No 
show, No Pay’ basis or should the job 
seeker, at some point, become fully 
precluded from income support for a 
period?
If a job seeker is unable to undertake 
intensive activities for 50 hours per 
fortnight due to personal circumstances, 
what is an appropriate activity for them to 
undertake?
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Chapter 4—Transition to the new model
The Government is mindful that transition from 
the current contracts to the new model of 
service delivery will create implementation 
issues that will require careful attention. 
Experience suggests that the transition of job 
seekers can impact negatively on job seeker 
servicing and can create uncertainty and 
disruption for job seekers and providers alike. 
This in turn has historically created reductions in 
provider performance over the transition period, 
and this needs to be minimised in 2009. 
Transition of the existing case load of the  
Job Network and other providers into the new 
model also creates significant cost pressures 
because of the characteristics of the case load 
and the Government’s desire to provide a new 
tailored and flexible model for all job seekers. 
Against this background, DEEWR will manage 
the transition process against the following 
principles:
transition activities must support the 
commencement of the new model on time 
on  July 2009
transition activities must be consistent with 
the design of the new model, while existing 
contractual obligations must be honoured
all eligible job seekers must be referred to new 
providers contracted under the new model as 
efficiently and sensitively as possible. 



Appendix 5 contains an indicative description of 
how Job Network, PSP and JPET clients could be 
transitioned to the new model. Work will also 
need to commence on:
determining how best to manage WfD and 
Green Corps projects and participants during 
the period  July 2009 to 3 December 2009
managing the wind-down of NEIS as a  
stand-alone program, and its participants  
as at 30 June 2009
implications for Harvest Labour providers and 
their clients over the transition period
how best to wind up the licensing 
arrangements for JPLOs. 




Discussion point 16: 
Based on your experience with previous 
transitional periods, what are the key issues 
that you believe will need to be managed? 
How can we learn from what has worked, 
and what hasn’t worked, in the past?
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Existing providers
The Government wants to ensure that, in the 
transition to the new model, the expertise of 
specialist providers is retained. This may occur 
through specialist providers tendering for work, 
or by specialist providers forming partnerships 
and alliances with more generalist providers.
As providers would agree, it is also very 
important that current providers continue to 
deliver a high level of service, as detailed in the 
ESC/Funding Deed 2006–09, including:
working with participants or job seekers  
in removing barriers to employment 
assisting participants or job seekers in  
finding and supporting sustainable,  
full-time employment
managing relationships with employers  
and local industry
providing necessary guidance to your site-
based staff to manage the transition process
communicating with DEEWR to provide 
feedback and for issue resolution.
The Government will continue to pay for 
services delivered under the current ESC, 
outcomes as a result of placements anchored 
during the ESC 2006–09 contract period, and 
invoices from the appropriate use of the JSKA. 
In the period leading up to  July 2009, it is 
expected that providers who do not tender or 
win a new contract, will continue to deliver 
services irrespective of whether they are 
continuing to do so in the new model. However, 
DEEWR will consider, on a case-by-case basis, 
requests from providers to exit their contract 
early. The Government has made no allowances 
for the funding of exit packages.





Discussion point 17:
How can we best ensure the new 
employment services system retains 
specialist providers?
Is there anything DEEWR can and  
should do to assist providers in delivering  
a quality service for the remainder of this 
contract period? 
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Chapter 5—Next Steps
Public consultations on the new approach to 
employment services will commence on  
9 May 2008. Sessions will be conducted  
around Australia.
More information on the consultations can be 
found at www.workplace.gov.au/ESpurchasing
The Government will consider the views and 
feedback you provide in the consultations and 
determine how best to incorporate this in the 
new approach to employment services and 
determine any necessary revisions. 
It is anticipated that procurement will begin 
with release of an exposure draft Contract and 
Request for Tender in July 2008.
In September 2008 a Request for Tender will be 
issued with a view to the new contracts 
commencing on  July 2009.
Information Technology 
The Government is determined to ensure that 
the information technology system that 
underpins any new model provides strong 
support to providers and reduces unnecessary 
workload wherever possible. This will require 
major redevelopment of DEEWR employment 
services IT systems.
To ensure employment service providers have 
maximum opportunity to provide input into the 
systems development process, DEEWR will run 
an extensive series of publicly accessible 
information sessions using web conferencing 
technology.
The proposed web conferences will be 
designed to both inform providers about 
potential systems options and opportunities, 
and capture provider feedback on preferences 
and issues. Timing of these conferences will be 
advised soon.
Discussion point 18:
Are there any specific issues you would like 
addressed as part of the DEEWR information 
technology information sessions?
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Chapter 6—How to Respond
You can make a written submission on future 
directions for employment services before 
2 June 2008. You can also attend one of the 
public consultation sessions commencing 
9 May 2008.
A list of all the specific Discussion Points in this 
discussion paper are contained in Appendix 6. 
An interactive reply template is available from 
the Employment Services Review website at 
www.workplace.gov.au/ESReview
The form can be filled in online and emailed,  
or printed and mailed. 
Alternatively you may wish to send detailed 
comments by mail or email.
Submissions must be received by  
12 June 2008 in order to be considered  
for this phase of the review.
Submissions may be lodged  
by mail to:
Employment Services Review 
Department of Education, Employment and 
Workplace Relations 
GPO Box 9879 
Loc: 0M62 
CANBERRA ACT 260
Submissions may be lodged  
by email to:
FutureEmploymentServices@deewr.gov.au
Please note that the Australian Government may 
publish submissions received, in full or in part,  
at www.workplace.gov.au/ESReview 
or in other places including print publications. 
However, you may choose not to have your 
submission published. You need to indicate  
if you do not wish your submission to be 
published by marking the box on the first page 
of the template or by stating so clearly in any 
covering letter or email.
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APPENDIX 2—JSCI Review
The JSCI will be used to identify job seekers at 
risk of long-term unemployment and stream 
them into relevant services. The Government is 
considering how the JSCI can more effectively, 
appropriately and efficiently determine a job 
seeker’s level of disadvantage to ensure early 
and pertinent interventions and the instrument 
is currently being reviewed towards this end.
The review began in April 2008 by canvassing  
the views of stakeholders in order to gather 
information about the strengths and weaknesses 
of the current model and to seek suggestions for 
improvements. This consultation took the form of 
an ‘Invitation to Submit’ letter extended to peak 
bodies, service providers and other stakeholders, 
face-to-face, in-depth interviews with selected 
service providers and focus groups with  
job seekers. On 7 April ‘Invitations to Submit’ 
were extended to peak bodies and Job Network 
member CEOs. The closing date for submissions 
(6 May) has been extended to 2 June. Interviews 
with selected service providers have been 
completed and focus groups with  
job seekers are currently underway.
The JSCI is being reviewed against the following 
Terms of Reference:
Effectiveness
The effectiveness, accuracy and robustness  
of the JSCI in identifying clients for early 
intervention are being examined, especially  
in regard to:
identifying job seekers at risk of long-term 
unemployment, and for immediate access to 
intensive forms of employment assistance 
and/or other interventions
identifying job seekers for further specialised 
assessment and referral to appropriate services
identifying disadvantage in different groups 
of job seekers, including those disadvantaged 
by local factors.



Appropriateness
The appropriateness of the JSCI in identifying 
disadvantage in customers who register for 
income support and/or public employment 
services is being examined in the review, 
including an investigation of:
the application of the JSCI by Centrelink,  
job capacity assessors and Job Network
the appropriateness of the factors and 
weightings that make up the JSCI, with 
consideration being given to including  
new factors such as previous income  
support history
any undue administrative burden associated 
with the application of the JSCI 
whether the JSCI should be readministered 
to job seekers at set time intervals; (e.g. every 
2 months), to accurately identify prevailing 
disadvantage
the mechanisms in place to ensure early 
identification of changes to a job seeker’s 
circumstances that may affect his or her 
employment prospects.
Efficiency
The efficiency of the JSCI is being examined to 
assess whether:
JSCI assessments are conducted in a manner 
which is timely, and which result in reliable 
and valid assessments
referral processes, and linkages with other 
programs and services, are streamlined as  
far as possible
the outcomes from decisions based  
on the JSCI demonstrate an equitable  
trade-off between expenditure and  
job seeker assistance.








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APPENDIX 3—JCA REVIEW
As part of its Social Inclusion agenda,  
the Government made a commitment to  
review JCA processes. 
The Minister for Human Services, Senator the 
Hon Joe Ludwig, wrote to stakeholder 
organisations on 2 February 2008, seeking their 
views on how JCA services could better meet 
the needs of people with barriers to work, 
service providers and the Australian community.
Fifty-five responses were received from a wide 
range of organisations, including advocacy 
groups, associations representing allied health 
professionals and health professionals, 
JCA providers, employment service providers, 
and review and complaints bodies such as the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman. 
The responses raised some practical issues and 
put forward some useful suggestions for 
improvements to guidelines, systems and 
processes. The Minister is currently considering 
these issues and possible approaches, and 
expects that work will commence shortly with 
stakeholders to develop the detail of new 
arrangements. 
Following work undertaken by the Department 
of Human Services with JCA providers,  
NESA and other stakeholders in 2007,  
good progress is already being made on 
improvements to training, quality assurance  
and performance measurement.
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APPENDIX 4—Continued
Service fees
Service fees are proposed to be based on an hourly rate of $84 per hour for streams  and 2 and 
$93 for streams 3 and 4. All fees are GST inclusive. 
All initial interviews will be based on rate of $84 per hour. Work experience contacts will be based 
on $90 per hour. The service fee payment arrangements will be finalised through the consultation 
process.
Stream 1
Type of assistance Total time for all contacts in period
Initial interview 0.75 hours
Skills Assessment  hr
Training Activity 60 hrs over 2 weeks
Contacts 3.25 hrs
Stream 2
Type of assistance Total time for all contacts in period
Initial interview 0.75 hours
Contacts 0.75 hrs
Stream 3
Type of assistance Total time for all contacts in period
Initial interview 0.75 hours
Contacts 2.25 hrs
Stream 4
Type of assistance Total time for all contacts in period
Initial interview 0.75 hours
Contacts 29 hrs
Work Experience 
Type of assistance Total time for all contacts in period
Contacts 4.5 hrs
Work Experience Service Fee $320
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The fees for contacts in streams 2, 3 and 4 are inclusive of activities such as a skills assessment, 
training, work experience, counselling and general ongoing contact with the provider.
The work experience service fee is multiplied by .7 for remote clients and for full-time work 
experience clients.
Employment pathway fund
Credit
Stream  $
Stream 2 $550
Stream 3 $00
Stream 4 Year  $00
Year 2 $550
Work Experience $490
Amounts are GST inclusive.
The work experience credit is multiplied by .7 for remote clients and for full-time work 
experience clients.
Job placement fees
Description Fee
Stream  For job seekers who have completed a skills assessment where 
the placement provides paid employment for between 5 to 49 
hours within 0 consecutive working days (for job seekers with 
part-time work requirements only).
$385
For job seekers who have completed a skills assessment where 
the placement provides paid employment for a minimum of 50 
hours within 0 consecutive working days.
$440
Streams 2 to 4 and 
Work Experience
For job seekers who have completed a skills assessment where 
the placement provides paid employment for between 5 to 49 
hours within 0 consecutive working days.
$385
For job seekers who have completed a skills assessment where 
the placement provides paid employment for a minimum of 50 
hours within 0 consecutive working days.
$550
All fees are GST inclusive.
.
2.
.
2.
.
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APPENDIX 5—INDICATIVE TRANSITION OF JOB SEEKERS 
TO VARIOUS STREAMS
Client Group Current 
Characteristic
New service 
entry point
Period in 
service
Timing of entry 
into service
Employment Pathways 
Account credit
Highly Disadvantaged     
< 2 mths Stream 3 2 mths Immediate $550
> 2 mths &   
< 24 mths Stream 3 2 mths After 6 mths $550
> 24 mths (30%) Stream 3  6 mths After 6 mths $550
> 24 mths (70%) Work Experience Ongoing Immediate $250
Non-highly Disadvantaged
In JSS (< 3mths) Stream  Ongoing Immediate $
> 3 mths and  
< 2 mths Stream  Ongoing Immediate $
In ISCA < than 3 mths 
(2-5 mths) Stream 2 2 mths Immediate $550
In ISCA > than 3 mths 
(5-8 mths) Stream 2 2 mths After 3 mths $550
In IS contacts  (8-23 
mths) Stream 2 6 mths After 6 mths $550
Commencing ISCA 2 
(24mths+) (30%) Stream 3 6 mths After 6 mths $550
Commencing ISCA2  
(24 mths+ (70%) Work Experience Ongoing Immediate $250
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Indicative transition of PSP and JPET clients
Client Group Current 
Characteristic
New service 
entry point
Period in 
service
Timing of entry 
into service
Employment Pathways 
Account credit
Personal Support Programme
< 2 months Stream 4
Up to 8 
months Immediate $00
> 2 months* Stream 2 2 months Immediate $550
> 2 months* Stream 3 2 months Immediate $550
> 2 months*
Work 
Experience Indefinite Immediate
Work Experience  
credit payable
Waitlist Stream 4
Up to 8 
months
Over the first 
year $00
Suspensions Stream 4
Up to 8 
months
Over the first 6 
months $00
Job Placement, Employment and Training program
Current JPET 
participants Stream 4
Up to 8 
months Immediate $00
* Based on JSCI/JCA
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APPENDIX 6—DISCUSSION POINTS 
Discussion point 1:
In addition to the development of  
job seekers  job search techniques, 
training and work experience, are there  
other activities that should be approved  
as an intensive activity? 
How should we best balance the need to ensure 
a job seeker receives assistance appropriate to 
their needs with the provider’s responsibility to 
manage funds effectively across their case load?
Discussion point 2: 
Employment service providers will be given 
flexibility to determine the frequency of their 
contacts and other activities in accordance with 
the needs of the job seeker. However, to ensure  
a reasonable level of service, providers will be 
expected to meet regularly with job seekers  
and this will be reflected in the job seekers EPP. 
Should there be a minimum contact requirement? 
For example, should providers need to meet with 
job seekers at least once per month?
Discussion point 3: 
What are the practical administrative issues that 
will need to be resolved in order to ensure the 
streams are as effective as possible?
Discussion point 4: 
What should and should not be able to be 
purchased with the EPF? 
Which is preferable, a principles-based approach 
to prohibited items or an exhaustive list of 
prohibited items?
Is there anything about the proposed EPF  
that may contribute to it being under-utilised?
At what level should purchases be permitted  
on the basis of a simple invoice and without the 
need for detailed case by case justification?
Discussion point 5:
How can the legitimate interests of a job seeker 
to choose a service provider be balanced with 
the need to provide certainty for providers? 
Discussion point 6: 
Are there any further improvements that can be 
suggested to deriving and paying service fees? 
Are there alternatives to claw back mechanisms?
How should fees be shaped to discourage parking?
Discussion point 7:
Should activity test requirements be made more 
flexible and responsive to job seekers  
needs? If so how?
The Government has already acted to ensure 
that job seekers participating in approved 
training are no longer forced to accept work  
that would interfere with that training.  
Are there other areas in which a similar  
approach should be adopted?
Should job seekers with recognised 
qualifications or skills be permitted to restrict 
their job search to their chosen field for a period? 
If so, for how long, and in what circumstances?
Discussion point 8: 
How can the needs of parents returning to the 
workforce be balanced with the need for greater 
employment participation? Should volunteering 
be incorporated into participation requirements 
for parents? 
Discussion point 9: 
How can universal employment services be 
better integrated with CDEP and IEP?
Discussion point 10:
How can best practice be disseminated to 
encourage adoption elsewhere? 
How should the success of innovation  
projects be judged?
Page 39 of 39
Discussion point 11: 
If a benchmark was adopted, how would it  
be set? Would each provider’s benchmark be 
the same, or would it differ based on the make 
up of their case load or the nature of their 
labour market? 
How could the interests of the hardest to  
place be advanced by the performance 
management system?
How can the experience of job seekers and 
employers best be included when assessing  
the performance of providers?
Discussion point 12:
How should ESAs be determined and how  
can they be aligned more closely with natural 
labour markets?
Discussion point 13:
Should both Centrelink and employment service 
providers be required to contact job seekers 
about Participation Reports? 
Discussion point 14:
Remembering that the comprehensive 
compliance assessment is an opportunity to 
identify barriers or service options, what number 
of Participation Reports submitted in a particular 
timeframe trigger an assessment?
Should the trigger be the same for rapid 
reconnection failures as for No show,  
No pay failures?
Discussion point 15:
What should happen if the job seeker re-
engages through participation in an intensive 
activity but then again fails to meet their 
requirements (a persistent no show)?  
Should payment be lost on a No show,  
No Pay  basis or should the job seeker, 
at some point, become fully precluded from 
income support for a period?
If a job seeker is unable to undertake intensive 
activities for 50 hours per fortnight due to 
personal circumstances, what is an appropriate 
activity for them to undertake? 
Discussion point 16: 
Based on your experience with previous 
transitional periods, what are the key issues  
that you believe will need to be managed?  
How can we learn from what has worked,  
and what hasn’t worked, in the past? 
Discussion point 17:
How can we best ensure the new employment 
services system retains specialist providers?
Is there anything DEEWR can and should do  
to assist providers in delivering a quality service 
for the remainder of this contract period?
Discussion point 18:
Are there any specific issues you would like 
addressed as part of the DEEWR information 
technology information sessions?
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